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Abstract 
 An experiment is reported examining dual-process models of belief bias in 
syllogistic reasoning using a problem complexity manipulation and an inspection-time 
method to monitor processing latencies for premises and conclusions. Endorsement 
rates indicated increased belief-bias on complex problems, a finding that runs counter 
to the “belief-first” selective scrutiny model, but which is consistent with other 
theories, including “reasoning first” and “parallel-process” models. Inspection-time 
data revealed a number of effects that, again, arbitrated against the selective scrutiny 
model. The most striking inspection-time result was an interaction between logic and 
belief on premise processing times, whereby belief-logic conflict problems promoted 
increased latencies relative to non-conflict problems. This finding challenges belief-
first and reasoning-first models, but is directly predicted by parallel-process models, 
which assume that the outputs of simultaneous heuristic and analytic processing 
streams lead to an awareness of belief-logic conflicts than then require time-
consuming resolution. 
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Belief-Logic Conflict Resolution in Syllogistic Reasoning: Inspection-Time Evidence 
for a Parallel-Process Model 
 Belief bias in reasoning is a non-logical tendency to accept conclusions that 
are compatible with beliefs more frequently than conclusions that contradict beliefs. 
The bias is more pronounced on invalid than valid problems, giving rise to a logic by 
belief interaction in conclusion-endorsement rates that has been studied extensively 
since it was established by Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983). Contemporary 
theories of belief bias are couched within a dual-process framework (e.g., Evans, 
2006; Stanovich, 2004) which characterises the phenomenon as arising from the 
interplay between belief-based “heuristic” processes that are rapid, associative and 
implicit, and logic-based “analytic” processes that are slow, sequential, explicit, and 
constrained by working memory limitations. The belief-bias effect suggests that 
heuristic processes may often dominate over analytic processes in cueing responses. 
 Dual-process theories of belief bias have gained support from a wide range of 
sources, including: neuroimaging studies demonstrating the neurological 
differentiation of logic-based and belief-based responding (Goel & Dolan, 2003); 
research indicating how resolving belief-logic conflicts in favour of logic declines 
with age (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994); and studies demonstrating how people high in 
general intelligence are better able to resist belief bias (Stanovich & West, 1997). 
Despite the support for a general dual-process view of belief bias, however, little 
consensus exists as to which specific dual-process theory of belief bias is best able to 
capture the full range of available data. Indeed, all current theories gain some support, 
yet differ markedly in their assumptions about the sequencing of heuristic and 
analytic operations. 
The primary goal of the present research was to realise a syllogism-
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complexity manipulation so as to examine predictions deriving from three distinct 
classes of belief-bias theory that we refer to as “belief-first”, “reasoning-first” and 
“parallel-process” models (we are grateful to Jonathan Evans, personal 
communication, for this characterisation of theories). Our research was also 
motivated by a secondary goal, which was to employ an inspection-time measure of 
processing to clarify how heuristic and analytic processes compete to determine 
responding. To this end, we developed a computer-based, mouse-contingent display 
technique to monitor problem inspection-times for syllogism components (cf.  
Roberts & Newton, 2001; Schroyens, Schaeken, Fias, & d'Ydewalle, 2000)1. 
We know of two previous belief-bias studies that involved response-time 
measures (i.e., Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, 
Gunter, & Campbell’s, 2003). These studies revealed some inconsistencies in 
observed effects, although they converged in showing that people spend more time 
processing syllogisms with believable conclusions. Both studies, however, had 
limitations that the present research aimed to overcome. In Ball et al.’s (2006) 
experiment conclusion validity was confounded with premise configuration such that 
valid conclusions were always presented with “Some A are B; No B are C” premises, 
whilst invalid conclusions were always presented with “No A are B, Some B are C” 
premises. Thompson et al.’s experiment involved a latency measure that simply 
recorded the overall time to evaluate conclusions. This rather coarse measure may 
have obscured more subtle chronometric evidence that might emerge from a finer-
grained examination of the locus of processing effort on premise and conclusion 
components. Moreover, Thompson et al. failed to examine latency data for violations 
of normality, yet such violations are common in chronometric data and can impact 
severely on test validity (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003). 
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Belief-First Models 
Belief-first theories come in two distinct flavours, referred to by Evans (in 
press) as pre-emptive conflict resolution and default-interventionist models. An 
example of the former is the selective scrutiny model (Evans et al., 1983). This 
assumes that believable conclusions are responded to heuristically (and simply 
accepted), whereas unbelievable conclusions motivate more rigorous analytic 
processing directed at testing conclusion validity. Evans and Pollard (1990) found 
support for the selective scrutiny model by demonstrating how a complexity 
manipulation affected discrimination of true from false conclusions, but not the 
magnitude of the belief-bias effect. This makes sense under the selective scrutiny 
model (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993), since belief is processed first, followed by 
an attempt at logical analysis; if analytic processing fails (more likely with complex 
problems) then random errors will ensue. 
Evans and Pollard’s (1990) apparent failure to find increased belief bias with 
complex problems has, however, been questioned by Klauer, Musch, and Naumer 
(2000), who note that the decreased variance observed in responses to such problems 
actually suggests that “the relative impact of belief was larger in the groups with 
complex problems” (Klauer et al., 2000, p. 856, emphasis added). This proposal 
underlines the need for further research exploring how complexity influences belief 
bias. It is also important to consider what the selective scrutiny model might predict 
concerning inspection times. Presumably, the premises of unbelievable conclusions 
should be inspected for longer, since reasoners are more likely to engage in analytic 
processing for these than believable ones (Evans, 2007). Such increased processing of 
unbelievable syllogisms should arise irrespective of problem complexity.  
Default-interventionist models also assume an early influence of beliefs, 
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viewing heuristically-cued “default” responses as being either supported or inhibited 
by subsequent analytic processing. For example, the selective processing model 
(Evans, 2000, 2007; Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001), proposes that the default 
heuristic response is to accept believable and reject unbelievable conclusions, which 
explains why belief-bias arises on both valid and invalid problems. If analytic 
processes intervene, however, then it is assumed that such processes will try to 
construct only a single mental model of the premises. But this analytic component of 
reasoning is itself biased by conclusion believability, such that a search is initiated for 
a confirming model when the conclusion is believable and for a falsifying model 
when the conclusion is unbelievable (cf. Klauer et al., 2000). These assumptions 
readily explain the increased belief-bias seen on invalid syllogisms since both 
confirming and falsifying models exist. 
The selective processing model also explains the increased belief bias and 
decreased logical performance that was predicted and observed under speeded-
response instructions by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005), since these effects would 
be a natural consequence of elevations in default, heuristic responding. Presumably, 
too, any effect of problem complexity on the magnitude of belief bias would likewise 
arise through increased recourse to default responding and diminished analytic 
intervention (i.e., there should be an increase in belief-bias and a decrease in logic-
based responding). As for inspection-time predictions, the selective-processing model 
differs from the selective scrutiny model and does not predict that people will take 
longer to process unbelievable conclusions, since analytic intervention is just as likely 
for believable as unbelievable conclusions (Evans, 2007). 
Reasoning-First Models 
Reasoning-first models of belief bias propose that people strive to reason 
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analytically, only falling back on heuristic responding when analytic processing fails. 
Such accounts have been referred to as computational escape hatch models (Ball & 
Quayle, 2000; Stanovich & West, 2000). A recent example is Quayle and Ball’s 
(2000) metacognitive uncertainty theory, which is closely allied to the misinterpreted 
necessity model proposed by Evans et al. (1983). Both accounts emphasise 
uncertainty as a determinant of belief-bias, with people producing a belief-based 
response when a conclusion is possible but not necessitated by the premises (i.e., 
when conclusions are indeterminate). The difference between the metacognitive 
uncertainty theory and the misinterpreted necessity model resides primarily in the 
weight that the former places on limited working-memory capacity as a cause of 
uncertainty.  
In terms of conclusion-acceptance rates, these reasoning-first theories predict 
that problem complexity should increase belief-bias (e.g., by further increasing 
uncertainty) and decrease logical responding. As for inspection times, reasoning-first 
models would predict more rapid responding with valid conclusions irrespective of 
problem complexity, since reasoners should generally be more confident with valid 
than invalid syllogisms. 
Parallel-Process Models 
 A third way in which heuristic and analytic reasoning processes may operate 
is as parallel processing streams. The best example of such a model is arguably 
Sloman’s (1996, 2002) theory, which posits parallel “associative” (heuristic) and 
“rule-based” (analytic) systems. Sloman proposes that both systems will usually try to 
generate a response, and that the rule-based system has some capacity to suppress the 
associative system, although the associative system always “has its opinion heard” 
and can defuse a rule-based response. This model would lead to response conflicts 
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whenever belief-based (associative) and logical (rule-based) processes cue different 
outputs. These conflicts, moreover, would need to be resolved, perhaps according to 
some mechanism favouring logic with a certain probability (see Evans, in press, for a 
mathematical instantiation of such a mechanism that captures standard belief-bias 
effects). Within a parallel-process model, problem complexity would presumably 
shift the balance of responding toward beliefs and away from logic since the analytic 
processing stream would have difficulty in delivering an output.  
 Inspection-time predictions for parallel-process models of belief bias are 
unique, since people should be “aware” of the conflict between belief-based and 
logic-based responses cued by the two systems (we are grateful to Jonathan Evans, 
personal communication, for alerting us to this). Such conflict awareness would arise 
for valid-unbelievable and invalid-believable syllogisms, and the need for conflict 
resolution should lead to increased processing times for these problems relative to 
those where belief and logic deliver equivalent responses (valid-believable and 
invalid-unbelievable syllogisms).  
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight undergraduates aged between 18 and 55 from the University of 
Derby received course credit for participation. None had received prior instruction 
concerning the psychology of reasoning. All were tested individually. 
Design 
 A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures design was used that manipulated figural 
complexity (AB-BC vs. BA-CB), mood (IEO vs. EIO), logic (valid vs. invalid 
conclusions) and belief (believable vs. unbelievable conclusions). To control for 
biases linked to preferred conclusion orders (A-C or C-A), problems were collapsed 
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across mood in all analyses. The use of the BA-CB figure to produce complex 
problems was based on evidence that people find this figure harder to process because 
demanding mental operations are required to ensure that middle terms of premises are 
represented contiguously (Espino, Santamaría, & Garcìa-Madruga, 2000, Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984; Stupple & Ball, 2005, 2007). Dependent measures were 
conclusion-acceptance rates and inspection times for premises and conclusions. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants received 16 target syllogisms (eight AB-BC; eight BA-CB) in 
IEO and EIO moods, preceded by four practice syllogisms in AEA, III, IAI and AEE 
moods. Belief-oriented contents drew on those employed by Quayle and Ball (2000). 
Unbelievable conclusions were definitionally false (e.g., Some cats are not animals), 
and believable conclusions were definitionally true (e.g., Some animals are not cats). 
Invalid conclusions were indeterminate (consistent with premises but not necessitated 
by them). For each figure there were equal numbers of valid and invalid problems and 
believable and unbelievable conclusions. Presentation order of target syllogisms was 
counterbalanced using a balanced Latin square design, with thematic contents 
systematically rotated through the 16 problems.  
Authorware 5.1 on a PC was used to present problems and standard 
instructions (cf. Ball et al., 2006) and to record responses and inspection times for 
problem regions. Participants were informed that for each problem there would be 
masked statements labelled “Premise 1”, “Premise 2” and “Conclusion”, and that a 
single click of the mouse on masked areas would reveal the underlying statement until 
the mouse was moved from that area. Participants could revisit masked areas as often 
as they wished before registering a “yes” or “no” decision as to the conclusion’s 
necessity.  
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Results and Discussion 
Conclusion Acceptance Rates 
 Conclusion acceptance data (Table 1) were subjected to a three-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). 
Main Effects. The analysis revealed standard effects of logic, F(1, 47) = 47.32, 
MSE = 0.14, p < .001, with more valid conclusions accepted than invalid, and belief 
F(1, 47) = 34.42, MSE = 0.19, p < .001, with more believable conclusions accepted than 
unbelievable. The effect of figure was unreliable, F(1, 47) = 2.88, MSE = 0.10, p = 
.096, though in the direction of more conclusion acceptances in the easier AB-BC 
figure.  
(Table 1 about here) 
 Two-Way Interactions. A typical logic by belief interaction was evident, F(1, 
47) = 9.15, MSE = 0.10, p = .004. In addition, belief bias increased in the BA-CB 
figure, as revealed by a significant belief by figure interaction, F(1, 47) = 6.17, MSE = 
0.06, p = .017. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests pinpointed the source of this interaction to a 
difference in acceptance rates for unbelievable conclusions across the figures (p = .002). 
This increased belief bias in the harder figure corresponds to the predictions of most 
theories, which assume that complexity will amplify cognitive load, thereby inducing 
more heuristic responding. The one theory that does not make this prediction is the 
selective scrutiny model.  
The selective scrutiny model also predicts a decrease in the effect of logic for 
the harder figure - as do the other theories described earlier - yet no logic by figure 
interaction was observed, F(1, 47) = 2.86, MSE = .08, p = .10. This failed prediction of 
extant theories may call into question the efficacy of our complexity manipulation, and 
we concur that a degree of caution is needed in interpreting our acceptance data. Still, 
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the increase in belief bias for the BA-CB figure seems readily interpretable as a 
complexity effect, and we wonder if the lack of a logic effect is an artefact of the 
generally reduced tendency to endorse conclusions in the BA-CB figure (except in the 
believable-valid condition).  
Higher-Order Interactions. In terms of higher-order effects, a significant three-
way interaction between logic, belief and figure was observed, F(1, 47) = 5.40, MSE = 
.06, p = .025. As can be seen from Table 1, the typical logic by belief interaction that is 
evident for the AB-BC figure is eliminated for the BA-CB figure. People evidently 
respond in a belief-biased manner to both valid and invalid conclusions in the harder 
figure, whereas belief bias only dominates responses to invalid problems in the easier 
figure, as is traditionally observed. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests confirmed this 
interpretation by revealing that: (1) more valid-unbelievable conclusions were rejected 
with the BA-CB than the AB-BC figure (p = .013); (2) more invalid-unbelievable 
conclusions were rejected with BA-CB than AB-BC (p = .049); and (3) more valid-
believable conclusions were accepted with BA-CB than the AB-BC (p = .033).  
Total Premise Inspection Times 
Total premise inspection times were subjected to a three-way ANOVA. Since 
data were positively skewed a logarithmic transformation was conducted to normalise 
the scores. Figure 1 shows premise inspection times for each condition in the form of 
transformed data converted back into natural units (seconds). 
(Figure 1 about here) 
The analysis revealed no influence of figure on premise inspection times, 
either as a main effect, F(1, 47) = 0.06, MSE = 0.04, p =.81, or in interaction with 
other factors. Existing belief-bias theories do not lend themselves to clear-cut 
predictions concerning the effect of figure on premise inspection times. Indeed, whilst 
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figural complexity might be expected to increase the processing of premises, such an 
effect might well be mitigated by increased belief-based responding, which could 
curtail processing time. On balance, then, one might expect little direct impact of 
figural complexity on premise processing times, as was observed. 
The analysis indicated no main effect of belief on premise inspection times, 
F(1, 47) = 0.38, MSE = 0.04, p = .54. This lack of a belief effect goes against the 
predictions of the belief-first selective scrutiny model, which assumes more premise 
processing for unbelievable than believable conclusions, since only unbelievable 
conclusions will receive analytic examination. Our failure to find a main effect of 
belief also runs counter to Thompson et al.’s (2003) study, where latency data 
indicated that people were actually spending more time processing syllogisms with 
believable conclusions than unbelievable ones (i.e., the opposite of what would be 
expected according to the selective scrutiny model). We recognise, however, that the 
absence of any form of belief effect in our analysis cannot be taken as strong evidence 
against extant theories because of possible concerns with statistical test power. For the 
same reason, we are cautious about interpreting this null effect as evidence supporting 
models that do not predict an influence of belief on premise inspection times.  
The ANOVA, however, did reveal a reliable effect of logic, F(1, 47) = 5.90, 
MSE = 0.04, p = .02, with increased premise inspection times for invalid problems 
over valid ones. Only the reasoning-first theories predict this effect. Crucially, 
however, the main effect of logic was qualified by the presence of a reliable logic by 
belief interaction, F(1, 47) = 9.74, MSE = 0.03, p = .003, with the premises of conflict 
problems (valid-unbelievable and invalid-unbelievable ones) being inspected 
substantially longer than the premises of non-conflict problems. Post-hoc Bonferroni 
tests indicated that: valid-unbelievable premises were inspected longer than valid-
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believable premises (p = .027); invalid-believable premises were inspected longer 
than invalid-unbelievable premises, although this difference was not reliable (p = .12); 
and invalid-believable premises were inspected longer than valid-believable premises 
(p = .001).  Only one belief-bias theory places a strong emphasis on the critical role of 
such conflict problems: Sloman’s (e.g., 2002) parallel-process model.  
Conclusion Inspection Analysis  
 We also conducted a three-way ANOVA to examine inspection-time effects 
arising during conclusion processing. Data were skewed, and distribution problems 
were again normalized using a logarithmic transformation. The analysis revealed a 
reliable effect of figural complexity, with BA-CB conclusions scrutinised for longer 
than the AB-BC ones, F(1, 47) = 4.53, MSE = .02, p = .039. This effect provides 
another strong hint that our complexity manipulation was successful in increasing the 
cognitive load associated with processing BA-CB problems. There was also a reliable 
effect of logic, F(1, 47) = 12.70, MSE = .02, p = .001, with invalid conclusions being 
scrutinised for longer than valid ones. There was no belief effect, F(1, 47) = 0.24, MSE 
= 0.06, p = .878, and no interaction effects approached significance.  
The main effect of logic across both figures seems to be most readily explicable 
in terms of reasoning-first theories, since people are predicted to engage in increased 
processing for invalid problems. We note, however, that if the parallel-process account 
was augmented with an assumption that invalid problems are more difficult to reason 
through than valid ones, then it could accommodate the observation of a logic effect on 
both conclusion processing and premise processing, whilst also dealing with the striking 
effect of increased processing times on the premises of conflict problems.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
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General Discussion 
Contemporary belief-bias accounts are framed as dual-process theories, whereby 
conclusion-endorsement decisions arise from the interplay between pre-attentive 
heuristic processes and conscious analytic processes (Evans, 2006, Stanovich, 2004). 
Given this dual-process characterisation of belief bias, our research had two objectives. 
First, we wanted to use a figural complexity manipulation to examine the predictions of 
three classes of dual-process theory that we have referred to as belief-first, reasoning-
first, and parallel-process models. Second, we wished to monitor inspection-times for 
syllogism components to clarify how heuristic and analytic processes drive responding.  
We note that there have been recent calls for the enrichment of belief-bias data through 
the addition of process-tracing and chronometric measures (e.g., Klauer et al., 2000), 
yet little research has taken up this challenge. Moreover, the two published studies that 
have monitored latencies in a belief-bias paradigm (Ball et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 
2003) have limitations that render their findings inconclusive. Our experiment 
attempted to improve on previous research, for example, by employing carefully 
controlled syllogisms and fine-grained process monitoring. 
Turning to our findings, conclusion-endorsement data revealed significantly 
increased belief bias on the harder figure as well as reduced logic by belief interaction. 
There was, however, no evidence for decreased logical responding on this harder figure. 
This pattern of findings runs counter to the selective scrutiny model – a belief-first 
model – since problem complexity should result in additional random error rather than 
recourse to belief-based responding (Evans & Pollard, 1990). This model would, 
therefore, predict decreased logical decisions with complex problems but no increased 
belief-bias (in direct opposition to our actual findings). 
The pattern of data is, however, broadly consistent with most other models of 
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belief bias, which concur in predicting an increase in belief-based responding for more 
demanding problems given that task complexity should undermine the effectiveness of 
analytic processing, thereby allowing belief-based decisions to take precedence. The 
attenuation in the logic by belief interaction with the harder problems also makes 
perfect sense for these models, since the influence of belief on both valid and invalid 
problems would be at its greatest with the demanding figure. The support for these 
models from endorsement data, however, is not incontrovertible, since they also predict 
decreased logical responding in the harder figure, which was not apparent. We have 
suggested that the lack of a logic effect is an artefact of the generally reduced tendency 
to endorse conclusions in the BA-CB figure; this may itself reflect a lack of confidence 
in responding that could be a by-product of problem difficulty (Quayle & Ball, 2000).  
In the case of inspection-time findings, there was no evidence for figural 
influences on inspection times for premises, although a reliable effect emerged in 
relation to conclusions. This latter result provides some support for the efficacy of our 
figural manipulation in inducing increased processing difficulties, although it is unclear 
why such an effect should be localised to conclusions rather than distributed across both 
premise and conclusion components. One possibility is that increased uncertainty 
induced by problem complexity leads to greater recourse to conclusion-centred 
reasoning (cf. Stupple & Ball, 2007).  
We found little effect of conclusion believability on premise or conclusion 
inspection-times. Although this finding concurs with reasoning-first and parallel-
process models – and contradicts belief-first models – we are cautious about over-
interpreting a null effect as evidence for or against extant theories of belief bias. More 
impressive evidence, however, comes from our observation of reliable increases in the 
inspection times for the premises and the conclusions of invalid problems relative to 
     Belief-Logic Conflict Resolution 
 
16 
valid ones, as per the reasoning-first theories, which assume greater levels of 
uncertainty with invalid problems given that conclusions are possible but not 
necessitated (Quayle & Ball, 2000; Thompson et al., 2003). This logic effect on 
processing time is contrary to the belief-first models and seems difficult to reconcile 
with them given their emphasis on conclusion believability as driving analytic 
processing. The logic effect, however, whilst also not predicted by the parallel-process 
model, is readily reconcilable with this theory if it is assumed that invalid problems 
require more analytic processing than valid ones (see Quayle & Ball, 2000, for 
supporting evidence). We also note that the parallel-process model assumes that the 
decision system that reconciles the outputs from the heuristic and analytic processing 
streams effectively waits for the results of both processing streams before producing a 
response (see Evans, in press, for a relevant discussion). Without this assumption the 
heuristic system would typically win out because of its processing speed, which would 
produce exclusively biased performance. 
Arguably our most striking inspection-time finding is the reliable interaction 
between logic and belief on premise processing, which indicates that conflict problems 
where logic and belief collide lead to increased processing latencies relative to non-
conflict problems, a result that replicates the trend identified by Ball et al. (2006). The 
one theory that places a central emphasis on the reconciliation of heuristic-analytic 
conflicts in reasoning is Sloman’s (e.g., 2002) parallel-process model. Given the 
compatibility of this model with the majority of our findings we feel that it may well be 
the strongest contender for a comprehensive account of our data. An additional strength 
of the model is its apparent parsimony. Other models require a considerable number of 
assumptions to accommodate conclusion-endorsement findings, yet such accounts still 
appear to struggle to interpret latency-based data. As a general dual-process theory of 
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reasoning, the parallel-process model certainly deserves further in-depth analysis across 
a range of reasoning paradigms to assess its generality.  
Perhaps the most important upshot of our study is the indication that whilst 
many dual-process theories are able to provide plausible accounts of acceptance-rate 
data (as they were in the present case), these theories seem to falter when it comes to 
accounting for chronometric evidence. As such, we suggest that our study underscores 
the value of going beyond conclusion-acceptance measures as a way to progress the 
advancement of dual-process theories in the reasoning domain. 
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Footnotes 
1There has been some debate in the literature over the efficacy of mouse tracking 
methodologies for studying reasoning processes on the Wason Selection Task (see 
Evans, 1996; Roberts, 1998; Evans 1998, for contrasting perspectives). We note, 
however, that our use of a mouse-contingent display technique circumvents many of the 
concerns identified by Roberts (1998), and reflects a method that he himself appears to 
favour (Roberts & Newton, 2001). 
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 Table 1 
Percentage of conclusion acceptances as a function of figural complexity, logic and 
belief 
 
 
           Figure AB-BC         Figure BA-CB  
Conclusion 
validity  
Believable  Unbelievable Mean  Believable Unbelievable Mean 
Valid 
 
76 72 74  88 60 74 
Invalid 
 
71 36 53  61 25 43 
Mean 74 54 64  74 42 58 
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Figure 1 
Mean inspection times for premises as a function of figural complexity, logic and 
belief. Transformed data have been converted back into original measurement units 
(seconds) for ease of interpretation, although this renders it impossible to display 
standard errors. We note, however, that, standard errors for the logarithmic scores 
ranged from .035 to .042.  
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Figure 2 
Mean inspection times for conclusions as a function of figural complexity, logic and 
belief. Transformed data have been converted back into original measurement units 
(seconds) for ease of interpretation. Standard errors for the logarithmic scores ranged 
from .026 to .038.  
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